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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 20050134-CA
GRAHAM AUSTIN,
Defendant/Appellant

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

ARGUMENT
I. APPELLANT DID NOT INVITE THE ERROR IN THE REASONABLE
DOUBT JURY INSTRUCTION
In the Brief of Appellee, the State mistakenly argues that Appellant invited the error
pertaining to the reasonable doubt jury instruction because Appellant's trial counsel
articulated to the court that they agreed with the final version of the jury instructions. Brief
of the Appellee at p. 8. Our sister jurisdiction in Colorado has determined, however, that
"...where an error or omission injury instructions is attributable to inadvertence or attorney
incompetence and not to trial strategy, a reviewing court should review for plain error rather
than viewing the contention as waived under the doctrine of invited error." People v. Hodges,
2005 WL 1645760 f 25, (Colo.App.,2005).

Although it appears Utah appellate courts have not specifically addressed the issue of
invited error as it pertains to unsettled areas of law, federal caselaw provides guidance. The
federal courts have expanded upon the concept of exceptional circumstances, as argued in
Appellant's opening brief and utilized in Utah courts, to include a "plain error" concept at
the stage of appeal. The United States Supreme Court explained in Johnson v. United
States. 520 U.S. 461,117S.Ct 1544,1549,137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997), that "...where the law
at the time of trial was settled and clearly contrary to the law at the time of appeal—it is
enough that an error be 'plain' at the time of appellate consideration." Id. The United States
Supreme Court agreed that the alternative would "...result in counsel's inevitably making a
long and virtually useless laundry list of objections to rulings that were plainly supported by
existing precedent." Id., 520 U.S. at 468, 117 S. Ct. at 1549.
The 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals analyzed this issue and explained that the question
at issue here is not whether the error was plain at time of trial, but whether it is plain based
on current law at the time of direct appeal

United States v. Retos. 25 F.3d 1220 (3d

Cir.l994)(emphasis added). In U.S. v. West Indies Transport, Inc., the 3rd Circuit Court of
Appeals also analyzed the doctrine of invited error as it applies specifically to jury
instructions and found that "...where a defendant submits proposed jury instructions in
reliance on current law, and on direct appeal that law is declared constitutionally infirm, we
will not apply the invited error doctrine." 127 F.3d 299 (3rd Cir. 1997).
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Appellant's counsel did not invite the alleged error in the instant matter because at the
time of trial the reasonable doubt jury instruction on which Appellant's counsel was relying
was a settled area of law. See, State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1997). However,
at the time of direct appeal, the law for which the instruction had relied on was abandoned
as unconstitutional. See, State v. Reyes, 2005 UT 33,116 P.3d 305. Therefore, because of
the substantial change in the law from the time of the trial to the time of direct appeal, the
change to the reasonable doubt jury instruction should be reviewed under either Utah's
"exceptional circumstances" rubric or the "plain error" doctrine, as outlined in Johnson,
Retos, and West Indies supra, and not the invited error doctrine.
It is not possible for Appellant's counsel to invite the alleged error when counsel did
not know that an error would exist. Writ of Certiorari was pending in the Reyes' case at the
time of the trial in this matter and the outcome was unpredictable. This is particularly true
given that two other cases, State v. Cruz 2005 UT 45, and State v. Weaver, 2005 UT 49, were
argued the same day as Reyes before the Utah Supreme Court. Both Cruz and Weaver were
arguing in favor of upholding Robertson, stating that they had been deprived of their rights
by not having the word "obviate" used in their respective reasonable doubt jury instructions.
Even those parties involved in Reyes may not have contemplated what that outcome would
be given that the cases argued at the same time were taking opposing positions to Reyes1.

1

The Utah Supreme Court upheld Reyes in Cruz and Weaver's cases and
determined that Cruz and Weaver's instructions had adequately conveyed the proper
standard to the jury without the now abandoned phrase at issue herein.
3

The error in the reasonable doubt jury instruction was also inadvertent. See, e.g.,
Hodges. Appellant's trial counsel unintentionally agreed with the jury instructions because
they were unable to predict what the outcome of Reyes would be. It was not possible to
object to the reasonable doubt jury instruction because Reyes was pending, See e.g. Johnson.
520 U.S. at 468, 117 S. Ct. at 1549. Therefore, trial counsel's failure to object at trial was
inadvertent and should be reviewed under Johnson's "plain error" standard or Utah's
exceptional circumstances rubric, as argued in Appellant's opening brief.
Although Appellant's counsel did not object to the jury instruction at trial, there were
exceptional circumstances that created a substantial likelihood that an injustice would result.
Allowing the jury to deliberate based on the reasonable doubt instruction "eliminate all
reasonable doubt" created the substantial likelihood that Appellant was found guilty based
on a degree of proof that is lower than the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard required in
criminal matters. See Reyes. As argued in Appellant's opening brief, allowing Appellant
to be found guilty on a degree of proof that is lower than "beyond a reasonable doubt"
violated their due process rights and therefore, created a situation of substantial injustice,
allowing exceptional circumstances to apply. As the Appellant's liberty is at stake and this
issue is constitutional, the appellate court is "...obliged to consider it even though it was not
raised in the trial court." State v. Jameson. 800 P.2d 798, 802 (Utah 1990). This unsettled
interpretation of the law colored the ability of Appellant's trial counsel to raise the issue at
trial, resulting an exceptional circumstance or Johnson's "plain error."

4

II. DEFENDANT'S REYES CLAIM RISES
TO EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES
In the Brief of Appellee, the State attempts to argue that Appellant cannot meet the
exceptional circumstances rubric. Brief of Appellee $. 10. Specifically, the State argues that
UT. R. CRIM. P. 19(E) prohibits a jury instruction from being assigned as error that was not
objected to at trial. Id. at p. 9. The State additionally argues that the law as of February,
2005 should govern on appeal even though that law was overturned as of the time of this
appeal. Id. at pp. 10-11. Caselaw indicates otherwise, however.
"As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised on
appeal." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, Ijl 1,10 P.3d 346. "The preservation rule applies to
every claim, including constitutional questions, unless a defendant can demonstrate that
'exceptional circumstances' exist or 'plain error9 has occurred."

Id.

Exceptional

circumstances are explained as "those which would explain and excuse a party's failure to
raise a claimed error in the trial court." State v. Webb. 790 P.2d 65 (Utah App. 1990). "The
exceptional circumstances concept serves as a 'safety device,' to assure that manifest
injustice does not result from the failure to consider an issue on appeal." State v. Archambeau
820 P.2d 920, 923 (Utah App. 1991).
"Unlike 'plain error,' 'exceptional circumstances' is not so much a precise doctrine,
which may be analyzed in terms of fixed elements, as it is a descriptive term used to
memorialize an appellate court's judgment that even though an issue was not raised below
and even though the plain error doctrine does not apply, unique procedural circumstances
5

nonetheless permit consideration of the merits of the issue on appeal." State v. Irwin, 924
P.2d5(UtahApp. 1996).
The Utah Supreme Court has similarly indicated that they ".. .are obliged to consider
[an] argument [not presented in the proceedings below when] it is based on a constitutional
question and defendant's liberty is at stake." State v. Jameson. 800 P.2d 798, 802-803 (Utah
1990). In State v. Lopez. 831 P.2d 1040 (Utah App.1992), this Court employed the
"exceptional circumstances" rubric where a change in law or the settled interpretation of law
colored the failure to have raised an issue at trial. In State v. Kazda, 545 P. 2d 190 (Utah
1976), the Utah Supreme Court discussed the exception to the rule requiring that jury
instructions be objected to at trial in order to preserve the issue for appeal. The Court states
that, "exception is applied only rarely where there appears to be a substantial likelihood that
an injustice has resulted. Then and only then will the failure to comply with the requirements
of the rule be excused." Id.
Although Appellant's trial counsel failed to object to the jury instruction at trial, there
were exceptional circumstances that created a substantial likelihood that an injustice would
result. Allowing the jury to deliberate based on the reasonable doubt instruction "eliminate
all reasonable doubt" created the substantial likelihood that Appellant was found guilty based
on a degree of proof that is lower than beyond a reasonable doubt. Allowing the Appellant
to be found guilty on a degree of proof that is lower than beyond a reasonable doubt is a
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violation of his due process rights and therefore, would create a situation of substantial
injustice, allowing exceptional circumstances to apply.
The fact that State v. Reves. 2005 UT 33, 116 P.3d 305, had been granted certiorari
but had not yet been decided also constitutes an exceptional circumstance and therefore
allows the Appellant to raise this issue on appeal. The Court's decision in Reyes is a
constitutional change in the law that was not forseeable at the time of trial, which took place
between the time of trial and the appeal. At the time of the trial Appellant's trial counsel
could not have objected to the jury instruction since, at the time, it was unforeseeable by any
in the legal profession, that the Utah Supreme Court would expressly abandon and overturn
an eight-year precedence respecting reasonable doubt jury instructions2.
The Utah Supreme Court found that the element of the Robertson test instructing the
jury that the State must "obviate all reasonable doubt" carried with it a substantial risk that
a juror may find the defendant guilty based on a standard that was lower than beyond a
reasonable doubt. Reyes, 2005 UT 33 f30, 116 P.3d 305. Because the jury in this matter
was instructed to "eliminate all reasonable doubt" and eliminate and obviate are synonyms,

2

It is important to note that two other cases, State v. Cruz. 2005 UT 45, and State v.
Weaver, 2005 UT 49, were argued the same day as Reyes before the Utah Supreme Court. Both
Cruz and Weaver were arguing in favor of upholding Robertson, stating that they had been
deprived of their rights by not having the word "obviate" used in their respective reasonable
doubt jury instructions. Even those parties involved in Reyes may not have contemplated what
the outcome would be given that the sister cases argued at the same time were taking opposing
positions to Reyes. The Utah Supreme Court upheld Reyes in Cruz and Weaver's cases and
determined that Cruz and Weaver's instructions had adequately conveyed the proper standard to
the jury without the now abandoned phrase at issue herein.
7

there is similarly a substantial risk that one of Austin's jurors found him guilty based on a
lower standard than beyond a reasonable doubt, thus violating Austin's due process rights.
Because Reyes had not yet been decided at the time Austin appeared for trial, Austin's
trial counsel's duty to raise the issue at trial was colored. See Lopez. The court's decision
in Reyes is a constitutional change in the law that was not forseeable at the time of trial,
which allows this matter to fall under the ''exceptional circumstances" similarly relied upon
in State v. Lopez. 831 P. 2d 1040 (Utah App. 1992). Alternatively, since Austin's liberty is
at stake here and this issue is constitutional this Court should be "...obliged to consider it
even though it was not raised in the trial court." State v. Jameson, 800 P.2d 798, 802 (Utah
1990). To allow the instruction to stand in light of its determined unconstitutionality would
be to deny Austin due process of law.
III. REYES DID NOT REQUIRE THE STATE TO ARGUE THAT IT NEED
ONLY DEFINE DOUBTS SUFFICIENTLY DEFINED BY THE JURY
In State v. Reyes, 2005 UT 33, the Utah Supreme Court undertook an extensive
analysis of their determination to abandon the Robertson test requiring the State to "obviate
all reasonable doubt," as more particularly set forth in the Brief of Appellant. See, Brief of
Appellant at pp. 18-19. During this analysis, the Utah Supreme Court stated as follows:
The process suggested by the "obviate all reasonable doubt" standard is also
flawed because, contrary to its purpose, it tends to diminish the degree of proof
necessary to convict. . .[t]he "obviation" of doubt contemplates a two-step
undertaking: the identification of the doubt and a testing of the validity of the
doubt against the evidence.. .[t]he beyond a reasonable doubt standard does
not, however, condition a conclusion that a doubt is reasonable on an ability
either to articulate the doubt or to state a reason for it. An unarticulated
8

conviction that the State has failed to meet its burden of proof will serve as a
legitimate basis to acquit.
Reyes at f27. This analysis indicates that a juror is legitimate in acquitting when they have
a doubt based on the belief that the totality of the evidence is insufficient, but cannot
specifically articulate what that doubt may be. Reyes at f28, citing Steve Sheppard, The
Metamorphoses of Reasonable Doubt: How Changes in the Burden ofProofHave Weakened
the Presumption of Innocence, 78 Notre Dame L.Rev. 1165 (2003).
The phrase that the State must "obviate all reasonable doubt" improperly permits the
State to argue that "it need only obviate doubts that are sufficiently defined," thereby
diminishing the State's burden. Reyes at ^[12. It is farreaching to believe that, in the process
of trying to prove their case, a prosecutor would orally articulate to a jury that, if the juror
feels doubt but cannot articulate or define it, then the State maintains no burden to overcome
it. It is clear from the Utah Supreme Court's overall analysis of this issue that it did not
intend for prosecutors to have to take this step in order for defendants to be protected from
the substantial risk inherent in the phrase at issue herein. Reyes at ^j25-30. To require such
would be to negate the Utah Supreme Court's position on the matter.
IV. TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SENTENCING APPELLANT TO
CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES WITHOUT THE BENEFIT OF A
PRE-SENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT
In the Brief of Appellee, the State attempts to argue that the trial court did not err in
sentencing the Appellant to consecutive sentences without the benefit of a pre-sentence
investigation report Brief ofAppellee at p. 15. The State also alleges that the Colorado case
9

and American Bar Association Guidelines cited in the Appellant's brief have no
"precedential value" in Utah. Brief of Appellee at p. 16. There are many cases were a
surrounding jurisdiction is looked to because there is no case law dealing with that issue in
Utah. For example, Buckner v. Kennard, 99 P.3d 842, (Utah, 2004) discusses that the Court
in that matter looks to other jurisdictions and their analyses of case law in making their own
determination for certain issues in that case. It is common practice that, where no Utah law
exists on point, cases from other jurisdictions are used as guidance to help decide issues in
the law.
UTAH CODE ANN

. § 76-3-401 states as follows:

(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more
than one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive
sentences for the offenses. The court shall state on the record and shall indicate
in the order of judgment and commitment: (a) if the sentences imposed are to
run concurrently or consecutively to each other; and (b) if the sentences before
the court are to run concurrently or consecutively with any other sentences the
defendant is already serving. (2) In determining whether state offenses are to
run concurrently or consecutively, the court shall consider the gravity and
circumstances of the offenses, the number of victims, and the history,
character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant.
State v. Perez. 52 P.3d 451, (2002 UT App.), holds as follows:
Trial court's brief comment concerning "gravity and circumstances of the
offenses" was insufficient basis to justify imposing consecutive sentences for
aggravated burglary and attempted murder; rather, trial court was required to
consider all statutorily prescribed factors, including recommendations of
presentence report, in determining whether to impose consecutive sentences.
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(emphasis added).

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 76-3-401(2) states that the "gravity and

circumstances of the offenses, the number of victims, and the history, character, and
rehabilitative needs of the defendant" must be taken into consideration by the court.
In this matter, the history, character and rehabilitative needs of Austin were not taken
into consideration. Two competency evaluations were performed and reports prepared by
two different doctors, but there is no evidence that these were ever taken into consideration
by the trial court. Both of these evaluations state that although Austin was competent to
stand trial, he also had severe depression and suicidal tendencies. Both of these conditions
alone should have warranted careful consideration. The court should have examined both
of those conditions very carefully before passing sentence. Having those conditions could
have had a substantial effect on Austin and contributed to incident in the instant matter.
Those conditions alone should have caused the trial court to carefully consider what type of
sentence would have been appropriate for Austin.
While there was a warrant out for his arrest for a domestic violence incident in
Colorado, no other prior history of Austin was taken into consideration by the trial court. His
mother had been hospitalized and was just put in a care facility, his marriage was falling
apart, he lost his job, and he had gone to visit his kids and his car had broken down. Tr. Vol.
I p. 142. He had also decided to overcome his addiction to methamphetamine. Id. When
he arrived home from seeing his kids he was going to face everything-his mother, his wife,
his addiction-instead he fell apart. Tr. Vol. I p. 143. He fell apart because of emotional and
11

mental stress he had been suffering. The stress he had been suffering should have been
considered careful by the trial court as it may have also played a significant part into why
Austin fell apart. Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion by not taking this matter into
consideration in imposing the consecutive sentences.
The trial court was also unable to consider all of the circumstances before sentencing
Austin to consecutive sentences because they did not have the benefit of a presentence
investigation report. Although Appellant did request to be sentenced the same day he was
convicted, the court should have ordered a presentence investigation report so that it would
have been advised of all factors before deciding to impose consecutive sentences. As this
matter involves the very serious crime of homicide, the trial court should review all factors
and circumstances before deciding whether to impose consecutive or concurrent sentences.
The trial court should especially consider all factors that may have affected the Appellant's
state of mind when deciding what kind of sentence to impose in a homicide. It is not possible
for the court to consider all relevant factors and circumstances without the benefit of a
presentence investigation report because it would not have access to all necessary
information in any other form.
As stated in Perez, the trial court was required to consider all recommendations of a
presentence investigation report in deciding whether to impose consecutive or concurrent
sentences. In the instant matter the court could not consider all of the recommendations of
a presentence investigation report because there was not one. The court also should have
12

considered the mental state and stress Austin had been under and was experiencing. As the
court did not consider all statutorily prescribed factors and circumstances, they abused their
discretion by imposing consecutive sentences.
IV. APPELLANT'S TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR
FAILING TO OBJECT TO THE CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES
THEREBY FAILING TO PRESERVE THIS ISSUE
In the Brief of Appellee, the State attempts to argue that Appellant's trial counsel was
effective. Brief of Appellee at p. 19. The Utah Court of Appeals has stated that, in order to
prove ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that "(\) trial counsel's
performance was objectively deficient and (2) there exists a reasonable probability that
absent the deficient conduct, the outcome would likely have been more favorable." State v.
Mecham. 2000 UT App 247, f21, 9 P.3d 777; see Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668,
687-88, 693, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 2066-67, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); State v. Bryant 965
P.2d 539, 542 (Ut. Ct. App. 1998).
Appellant alleges that his trial counsel was ineffective simply because she did not
object to the consecutive sentences and preserve the issue for appeal. Appellant's trial
counsel should have objected to the consecutive sentences as being an abuse of the court's
discretion because his emotional, mental state, and other statutory factors were not taken into
consideration. Had his trial counsel objected, he may have received concurrent sentence or
been sentenced for a lesser amount of time which would have been a more favorable outcome
for him. It is clear that Appellant's trial counsel's performance was objectively deficient and
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that there is a reasonable probability that, absent her deficient conduct, the outcome would
likely have been more favorable. Strickland.
CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, Appellant respectfully requests that this
Court reverse the trial court's Judgment, and remand for a new trial consistent with its
holdings.
DATED this

day of January, 2006.

William L. Schultz
Attorney for Graham Austin
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